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ABSTRACT 
 Why do different types of authoritarian regimes provide different levels of public 
goods? This thesis compares Chad’s personalist political regime to Gabon’s single-party 
regime in terms of their provision of different levels of public goods. The research 
suggests that a regime’s type, its survival strategies, and its vulnerability impact public 
goods distribution. More specifically, personalist regimes, like those in Chad since 
independence, that rely principally on coercive survival strategies are less likely to 
prioritize public goods distribution. By contrast, party regimes can use a wider array of 
survival strategies, including public goods provision, to remain in power. In both 
countries, greater oil revenue contributes to greater investments in public goods. The 
thesis informs theories of authoritarian regime behavior and political stability by 
examining the relationship between authoritarian regime type and public goods 
distribution in oil-producing states. 
  
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
1. Introduction to Debate ..................................................................3 
2. Authoritarian Regime Types ........................................................3 
3. Democracy vs. Authoritarianism in the Provision of 
Public Goods ...................................................................................6 
4. Why Authoritarian Regimes Provide Public Goods ...................8 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................12 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................13 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................16 
II. CHAD AND PERSONALISM ............................................................................17 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................17 
B. PERSONALIST REGIMES IN CHAD .................................................17 
1. Tombalbaye ..................................................................................18 
2. Habré .............................................................................................19 
3. Déby ...............................................................................................20 
C. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC GOODS IN CHAD.....................................21 
1. Infrastructure ...............................................................................22 
2. Health ............................................................................................23 
3. Education ......................................................................................24 
D. HYPOTHESIS 1: PERSONALIST SURVIVAL TACTICS AND 
PUBLIC GOODS .....................................................................................25 
1. Coercion as a Primary Survival Strategy ..................................25 
2. Erratic Public Goods Investments in Chadian Personalist 
Regimes .........................................................................................27 
3. Hypothesis 1 Summary ................................................................27 
E. HYPOTHESIS 2: TIME HORIZONS AND PUBLIC GOODS ..........28 
1. Time Horizon, Regime Vulnerability, and Public Goods .........29 
2. Hypothesis 2 Summary ................................................................32 
F. HYPOTHESIS 3: OIL REVENUE AND PUBLIC GOODS ...............32 
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................35 
III. GABON AND THE SINGLE-PARTY STATE ................................................37 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................37 
viii 
B. GABONESE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OVERVIEW ................38 
C. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC GOODS IN GABON ..................................39 
1. Health ............................................................................................40 
2. Education ......................................................................................40 
3. Infrastructure ...............................................................................41 
D. HYPOTHESIS 1: SINGLE-PARTY STATE SURVIVAL 
TACTICS AND PUBLIC GOODS ........................................................42 
1. The PDG’s Elite-Focused Survival Strategies ...........................42 
2. Public Goods and Local Leader Support ..................................45 
3. Other Survival Strategies: International Support, 
Coercion, and Vote Rigging ........................................................46 
4. Hypothesis 1 Summary ................................................................48 
E. HYPOTHESIS 2: TIME HORIZON AND PUBLIC GOODS ............49 
1. Time Horizons and Extraconstitutional Removal ....................49 
2. Elections and Time Horizons ......................................................51 
3. Hypothesis 2 Summary ................................................................52 
F. HYPOTHESIS 3: OIL REVENUE AND PUBLIC GOODS ...............52 
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................56 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................59 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...................................................................59 
B. IMPLICATIONS .....................................................................................62 
1. Academic .......................................................................................62 
2. Policy .............................................................................................62 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ....................................................63 
D. FUTURE FOR CHAD AND GABON....................................................64 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................67 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Military Expenditure (% of GDP) Chad and Sub-Saharan Africa 
1964–2018..................................................................................................30 
Figure 2. Chad’s GDP Per Capita (current US$) 2000–2019. ..................................33 
Figure 3. Chad’s Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US$), 2000–
2017............................................................................................................34 
Figure 4. Chad’s Primary School Enrollment, 1990–2015. ......................................34 
Figure 5. Gabon’s GDP (current US$) 2000–2008. ..................................................53 
Figure 6. Gabon’s Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US$) 2000–2009. .........54 
Figure 7. Gabon’s GDP (current US$) 1960–2019. ..................................................55 
Figure 8. Gabon’s Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US$) 2000–2017. .........56 
  
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
DGSSIE  General Directorate of State Security 
EA  Electoral Authoritarianism 
FROLINAT  National Liberation Front of Chad 
GDP gross domestic product 
GNI  gross national income 
GWF  Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz 
HDI  Human Development Index 
MPS  Patriotic Salvation Movement 
PDG  Gabonese Democratic Party 
PPT  Chadian Progressive Party 
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa 












I would like to thank my academic mentors who have shaped me into a better 
critical thinker, writer, and researcher. Without the guidance from Dr. Sigman and Dr. 
Barma, I could not have achieved the necessary level of academic rigor and analysis 
required for this thesis. I wish them well in the future, knowing that every student under 
their tutelage will have the opportunity to grow as I have.  
I could not have put in the essential work for this thesis if it were not for my 
wonderful wife, Rebekah, who had our first child, Diana, in the middle of my thesis 
process, and who kept baby Diana entertained during the COVID-19 lockdowns to allow 
me to write this thesis. I am eternally blessed by Rebekah and her longsuffering, generous 
support in helping me to pursue this and all of our goals. 
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
There exists very wide variation in the extent to which authoritarian governments 
provide public goods and services, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to their 
populations. Authoritarian governments are among both the best and worst in terms of 
public goods provision. Even among oil-producing authoritarian states in Africa, such as 
Gabon and Chad, there is wide variation in public goods provision. One potential reason 
for this variation is that there are many different types of authoritarian regime and power 
structure. This thesis addresses the question of whether and why different types of 
authoritarian regime provide different levels of public goods to their populations. It pays 
particular attention to this question in the context of oil-producing African states, 
specifically Chad and Gabon. 
This thesis argues that Chad and Gabon provide different levels of public goods 
because their regimes face different types of threats and, as a result, have different survival 
strategies and different time horizons. The personalist regimes in Chad provide low levels 
of public goods because, in the face of irregular and violent threats of extra-constitutional 
removal, the regimes have operated with short time horizons and have relied primarily on 
coercion to survive. The Gabonese single-party regime on the other hand, has primarily 
faced threats of removal through regular elections, and has adopted public goods provision 
as one of their five survival strategies. Thus, one of the main findings of the thesis is that 
time horizons are less important than the types of threats that leaders face: institutionalized 
electoral threats lead to more public goods provision and non-institutionalized threats of 
overthrow lead to fewer public goods. Additionally, in both states, oil revenue provides the 
regimes with resources to both enable survival tactics like patronage and fund public goods. 
Thus, when countries produce oil for longer, they are more likely to have higher levels of 
public goods irrespective of their regime type. 
2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
According to Freedom House, 61% of the world’s population lives in countries that 
are not completely free meaning that, even as democracy movements grow across the 
world, a majority of the world’s population, lives under some form of authoritarian 
regime.1 African states are disproportionately authoritarian, score low on human 
development measures, and have the fastest growing populations on earth. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular, only 12% of the population lives under regimes that are classified as 
“free.”2 Whether this large and growing segment of the population is likely to receive basic 
goods and services such as healthcare, education, water and critical infrastructure has 
implications for domestic and international security, economic growth and political 
stability. 
A study of authoritarian regimes and human development will help us better 
understand states and how international donors and development practitioners can possibly 
improve the lives of citizens. This work will examine in detail elements that improve 
human development, such as what political mechanisms seek to improve primary education 
or infrastructure development. If the international donor community better understands 
what political incentives improve the lives of its citizens, then they can more efficiently 
utilize their provided funds.  
The thesis also has implications for institutional reform programs. Institutional 
reforms often fail when applying international best practices, such as the “Washington 
Consensus,” because they do not take political context into account. This study better 
assists in understanding the political incentives that drive authoritarian leaders to deliver 
or not deliver public goods to their populations. If we can understand how and why states 
provide different levels of public goods, then we may be able to devise foreign assistance 
and governance programs to more effectively improve the lives of people on the fastest 
growing continent on Earth.  
 
1 “Freedom in the World 2018,” Freedom House, accessed November 29th, 2019, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 
2 “Sub-Saharan Africa,” Freedom House, November 29th, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-
saharan-africa.  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction to Debate  
To begin looking at which types of authoritarian regimes provide better public 
goods for its citizens, one has to first understand the different types of regimes and public 
goods. The literature on authoritarian regimes focuses primarily on how they differ from 
democracies, rather than on their varying capacity to enhance human development. Most 
of the literature on authoritarian regimes studies the differing nature of their political 
networks and what methods they use to remain in power after the third wave of 
democratization. Another smaller school of literature looks at economic and human 
development inside authoritarian regimes when compared both to democracies and to each 
other. All tend to use a wide examination lens that does not allow for an in-depth analysis 
within the institutions themselves that could provide insight into authoritarian regimes and 
their effect on public goods.  
2. Authoritarian Regime Types  
There is a growing literature recognizing the many different types of authoritarian 
regimes and how they differ. One of the most cited works in this area is by Barbara Geddes, 
Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (GWF), who wrote How Dictatorships Work: Power, 
Personalization, and Collapse; a comprehensive guide to authoritarian regimes.3 They 
identify four different types of dictatorships: monarchies, military dictatorships, civilian 
personalist rule, and single-party states.4 Authoritarian regimes typically emerge in a few 
ways: rigging an election, gradual removal of rights from a democracy, or violent take over. 
In turn, authoritarian regimes end either by a coup, uprising, rebellion, civil war, or foreign 
takeover, if the system for choosing leaders changes, or if the incumbent or allies lose an 
election to a different party.5 GWF’s research opened a discussion into authoritarian 
 
3 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, How Dictatorships Work (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 5. 
4 I do not focus on monarchies in this literature review because there are very few monarchies in the 
world, and only one (Eswatini) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
5 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 12. 
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regimes differences, but it does not look at the effects of that variation when it comes to 
public goods distribution or development. 
a. Military Dictatorship 
Military dictatorships are typically short-lived regimes led by a faction of military 
officers who, when faced with antigovernment opposition, typically turn over power to a 
competitive government. The literature on military dictatorship is based around Geddes’ 
work (1999). She states that military dictatorships begin when a faction of military officers 
decide who will rule over a state and influence policy decisions.6 Since the same 
mechanism that allowed a faction to take over remains a threat of division over policy 
decisions in the face of hazardous situations, officers often choose to return to their former 
post in the military. Jay Ulfelder (2005) remarks that military officers value the survival of 
the military as an institution above all else, which is sharply different from all other 
authoritarian regimes.7 Since they have an easy route out of government, they typically 
can retain former (more preferred) careers and statuses, and allow military regimes to end 
with negotiations for a new transitionary civilian government.8 They are rarely removed 
from power with force.9 Often mistaken with personalist regimes, not all regimes led by 
an individual in military uniform are military dictatorships; if the regime revolves around 
one individual who is above the law and the consent of the other officers, it becomes a 
personalist regime.10 
b. Civilian Personalist 
In a civilian personalist regime, power revolves around the office of one individual, 
whose removal often leads to violence for control. Such regimes are very resistant to 
 
6 Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument.” Paper 
presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA; 1999, 7. 
7 Jay Ulfelder, “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes” 
International Political Science Review 26, no. 3 (July 2005): 318. 
8 Geddes, 18. 
9 Geddes, 21. 
10 Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, “Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?” Studies 
in Comparative International Development 46, no. 4 (December 2011): 402. 
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internal splits due to their centralized network until the leader dies; they then subsequently 
collapse due to violent upheaval over the struggle among rival leaders for power.11 Geddes 
specifically describes a personalist regime as one where an individual triumphs during a 
struggle for power, and draws support from the organization of origin; while this may 
initially be effective, it often limits their supporters’ influence on policy and personnel 
decisions.12 Due to the cost of losing power for a personalist leader, which is often death 
or exile, they will typically only transition out of power through force, and will commonly 
renege on any agreements.13 Personalism is uniquely more repressive than other 
authoritarian regimes. That is due to their weakness to gain broad regime support among 
the population, since they often lack a strong party or an ideological base. Any alternative 
control system within or outside of the personalist regime becomes a threat to it that will 
likely be met with repression. Additionally, personalist dictators often retain personal 
control over the security services, and the security services therefore become linked to 
regime survival, which lowers their barrier to use violence to protect the regime.14 Often, 
the leader forms a political party to handle the administration of the government, but the 
party itself does not have independent decision making abilities.15 Personalist regimes can 
transform into single-party states only if they relinquish influence to their supporting 
bodies.  
c. Single Party 
Single-party regimes are to some extent similar to democracies in their structure of 
power sharing and opposition inclusion. Geddes describes single-party regimes as one 
party dominating access to political office and policy while at the same time, other parties 
may exist and compete in elections.16 Single-party regimes are the most resilient of all 
 
11 Geddes, 8. 
12 Geddes, 9. 
13 Geddes, 23. 
14 Erica Frantz et al.,” Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships,” The Journal of 
Politics 82, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 374.  
15 Geddes, 7. 
16 Geddes, 7. 
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types, and are seldom defeated internally, instead they are usually bested by outside 
forces.17 She argues that the strategy of the ruling coalition is to coopt potential opposition, 
through tactics such as including the opposition in the legislature and often promoting 
opposition demands.18 Charron and Lapuente add that single-party regimes are more 
receptive to citizens demands because they have a built in system to channel citizen’s 
voices via the party.19 Gandhi and Przeworski remark that single-party regimes have to 
create their own mobilization support network, which ties the party to more of the 
population and ultimately helps to build the party’s strength.20 Single-party regimes can 
feasibly transition into multi-party competitive democracies through a contested election 
in which an opposition party wins and changes power.  
3. Democracy vs. Authoritarianism in the Provision of Public Goods 
A debate exists over the ability of authoritarian regimes to provide public goods. 
To a large extent, this debate has compared authoritarian regimes to democracies; 
specifically examining whether democracies have a clear advantage at public goods 
distribution. The democratic advantage in public goods distribution is thought to primarily 
rest on electoral contestation; in other words, citizens ostensibly demand, through 
elections, more public goods from the government. Open authoritarian regimes that feature 
elections are more common than closed autocracies, which do not hold elections, yet there 
is little discussion in the debate over the differences among the regimes that hold elections, 
and their public goods advantages or disadvantages. Although they are not subject to 
traditional democratic forms of accountability, authoritarian leaders often form some kind 
of contract with their citizens that involves public goods provision. In some cases, electoral 
contests – even if not completely competitive, free or fair -- are a factor that could impact 
public goods distribution in authoritarian regimes. Lastly, one strand of this literature 
 
17 Geddes, 8. 
18 Geddes, 26. 
19 Charron and Lapeunte, 399. 
20 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under 
Dictatorships.” Economics & Politics 18, no. 1 (March 2006): 15. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0343.2006.00160.x. 
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examines the relationship between authoritarian regime types and their quality of 
government, responsiveness to citizen demands, and corruption.  
The literature comparing democracy and autocracy begins with the consensus view 
that democracies are inherently superior at public goods provision. Robert Deacon (2009), 
Martin McGuire and Mancur Olson (1996), argue this position in their research. Deacon 
argues a similar position to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) about the importance of the 
size of the winning coalition. Many democracies have larger winning coalitions than other 
forms of government, thus, their audience for public goods will also be greater. This is in 
contrast to most autocracies, many of which have smaller, elite-dominated coalitions.21  
There is also literature supporting the opposite claim; namely, that democracy is 
not distinctively superior at delivering public goods. Michael Ross (2006) and Rory Truex 
(2017) argue that the previous studies of democracy, authoritarian regimes and public 
goods provision are not as clear cut as is often accepted. Truex compares democracies and 
authoritarian states using Polity and GWF regimes with 14 public goods dependent 
variables. He finds that the democratic advantage over authoritarian regimes is minimal: 
life expectancy and infant mortality are nearly the same, and when considering student-
teacher ratios, autocracies perform better.22 Ross makes a similar argument; noting the 
equivalent infant mortality rates between regime types, but also highlighting how 
authoritarian regimes are possibly better suited to providing goods to all social classes 
rather than focusing primarily on the middle class. He finds that democracies spend more 
money than authoritarian states, but due to having larger winning coalitions, they seek to 
please the median voter (often a middle-income voter), ultimately leaving out public goods 
preference for the poor.23  
 
21 Robert Deacon, “Public Good Provision Under Dictatorship and Democracy,” Public Choice 139, 
no. 1 (April 2009): 260; Martin C. Mcguire, and Mancur Olson, “The Economics of Autocracy and 
Majority Rule the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,” Journal of Economic Literature 34, no. 1 (March 
1, 1996): 72–96; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press; 
2003). 
22 Rory Truex, “The Myth of the Democratic Advantage.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development (SCID) 52, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 275.  
23 Michael Ross, “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 4 
(October 1, 2006): 860. 
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A third perspective emphasizes that authoritarian regimes may provide many or 
few public goods. They provide goods to stay in power, to gain support ahead of elections 
or to garner a larger winning coalition. This raises the question of which types of 
authoritarian regimes provide more public goods and why. 
4. Why Authoritarian Regimes Provide Public Goods 
Authoritarian regimes are often viewed as providing public goods as a bargain 
between the elites and the common people. Raj Desai, Anders Olofsgard, and Tarik Yousef 
(2008) introduced the concept of an authoritarian bargain, which is an implicit arrangement 
between elites and citizens, similar to a social contract in that citizens relinquish political 
influence in exchange for public spending.24 Authoritarian states have often used public 
welfare spending instead of repression in order to maintain power.  
This logic is often applied to oil exporting authoritarian states. They can maintain 
regime durability by using oil revenue to invest in public goods for their population, 
without having to resort to violent repression. Ben Smith (2004), and GWF (2015), wrote 
about the durability of oil exporting authoritarian states, stating that they have a lower 
likelihood of civil war and antigovernment protests.25 Smith argues that oil exporting states 
use their export profits to invest in public goods and institutions that can provide either 
non-repressive or repressive means to respond to organized opposition in times where oil 
prices fall.26 Gonzalez (2018) adds that in particular that during oil booms rents are 
invested into public goods to cope with the increasingly competitive labor market between 
oil and the public sector.27 In other words, repression is not the only tool for an oil 
 
24 Raj M Desai, Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M. Yousef, “The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains.” 
Economics & Politics 21, no. 1 (March 2009): 93. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00337.x. 
25 Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes, “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival” British 
Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (April 2015): 287–306; Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime 
Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (April 
2004): 238, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00067.x. 
26 Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” 243. 
27 Lucas I. Gonzalez, “Oil Rents and Patronage: The Fiscal Effects of Oil Booms in the Argentine 
Provinces,” Comparative Politics 51, no. 1 (October 2018): 114. 
9 
exporting authoritarian regime’s durability; rather, they exert their political control through 
a mixture of public investment and repression.  
Scholars also debate whether elections in single-party states, regardless if they are 
free or fair, promote public goods provision. When looking at elections in authoritarian 
regimes, it is important to compare their impact on the gains in human development that 
come from elections in democracies. Nam Kyu Kim and Alex Kroeger, (2018) argue that 
the benefits of democracy on improving human development via electoral contestation are 
not replicated in autocratic states.28 Instead, they argue that autocracies with weak 
capacities face political violence around elections and transitions, which then leads to lower 
human development like higher infant mortality rates.29 Conversely, Miller (2015) argues 
that Electoral Authoritarianism (EA) improves human development in regimes. He adds 
that when single-party regime should regular elections, regardless if they are free or fair, 
they still improve public goods provision to aid their election chances.30 During elections, 
political incumbents face real challenges, often more than originally expected. Electoral 
Authoritarianism provides pressure on the regime to the point where they can even lose 
office and face regime collapse if they do not provide sufficient goods and services to the 
population, such as the case with the PRI regime in Mexico. Regime collapse via elections 
frequently leads to democratization. To avoid losing elections, incumbents therefore must 
address public concerns—including the issues important to voters, such as, commonly, an 
access to social welfare.31 Electoral Authoritarianism simultaneously develop political 
institutions such as bureaucracies and parties to win elections as well as provide services 
that deliver on public goods to limit opposition support.32 Such authoritarian tend to be 
 
28 Nam Kyu Kim and Alex M Kroeger, “Do Multiparty Elections Improve Human Development in 
Autocracies?,” Democratization 25, no. 2 (February 17, 2018): 253. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2017.1349108. 
29 Kim and Kroeger, 256. 
30 Michael K. Miller, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development,” Comparative Political 
Studies 48, no. 12 (October 1, 2015): 1535. 
31 Miller, 1534. 
32 Miller, 1537. 
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more liberal and offer at least some channels for popular pressure that leads to improved 
public goods distribution.33 
The more an autocratic state places emphasis on contested elections, the more 
accountable and responsive they tend to be to their citizens’ demands, leading to greater 
public goods distribution. There are very few closed autocracies today such as Saudi 
Arabia, or the UAE who do not feature these elections that improve accountability. 
Unfortunately, the literature does not speak to differences between Electoral 
Authoritarianism states nor does it speak on the impact of the oil-exporting dimension.  
Different types of authoritarian regimes may provide different levels of public 
goods because they vary in terms of their quality of government, such as the efficiency of 
the public bureaucracy and an impartial legal system. In the quality of government 
literature, there is an argument about the effectiveness of differing authoritarian regime 
types in providing public goods. Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente (2011), looks at 
authoritarian regimes in general to see which type produces the best quality of government. 
They define quality of government as the state’s capacity to conduct administrative action 
efficiently without corruption.34 They conclude that single-party states are the most 
effective at creating quality of government in high income countries where the citizens 
demand more accountability. They argue that single parties have higher quality of 
government because their formation does not often rely on previous institutions such as the 
military or courts. Instead, single parties cannot rely on the loyalty from the older 
organizations; they usually have to create their own popular support mobilization from the 
people, which in turn creates a more heterogeneous ruling coalition between trade unions 
and other organizations, and forms a pseudo social contract rather than the military 
dictatorship or a civilian dictator.35 Charron and Lapuente also note that monarchies are 
 
33 Miller, 1533. 
34 Charron and Lapuente, 398.  
35 Charron and Lapuente, 405. 
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close to single-party states in providing quality of government, but only if the monarchy 
has a long time horizon.36  
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) add a new dimension to 
the conversation on regime types; expanding it to include a look at public goods versus 
private good provision across all types of states, not just in democracies versus autocracies 
or its subgroups. They argue that no two democracies or autocracies are the same, since 
each has their own nuances in political mechanisms. Each state has a body of individuals 
who participate in politics, the selectorate, and those who rule, and benefit from victory, 
the winning coalition.37 The differences in the selectorates or winning coalitions varies 
across each state; it is not dependent simply on whether the state is a democracy or 
autocracy. They argue that the larger winning coalition a state has, the more likely it is to 
spend on public goods to benefit the entire population, instead of spending on private 
goods, for whom only the winning coalition benefits.38 However, smaller winning 
coalitions with large selectorates breeds loyalty and long serving leaders, which has the 
unfortunate effect of lower economic growth and lower public goods provision.39 
The literature that surrounds authoritarian regimes speaks with impressive breadth 
across the world. However, the quantitative research focuses on trends and it lacks a 
discussion on mechanisms. Currently, the discussion on institutions in autocratic regimes 
tends to focus on factors that predict their survival or compares them to democracies. A 
focus into the institutions themselves within the regimes and what ultimately differentiates 
authoritarian regimes is an important addition to the literature. There needs to be an in-
depth discussion on the differences between single-party states and personalist regimes, 
since those are more common, not only in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also across the world.40 
In particular, what political mechanisms that are unique to either single party or personalist 
 
36 Charron and Lapuente, 404. 
37 Bueno de Mesquita et al., 42. 
38 Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 386. 
39 Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 475. 
40 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014.“Autocratic Breakdown and Regime 
Transitions” Perspectives on Politics 12(2): forthcoming. 
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regimes in the world today are important to recognize and understand for public goods 
distribution?  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
A significant portion of authoritarian states are dependent on oil revenue, making 
it important to examine how resource dependence interacts with authoritarian politics in 
the provision of public goods. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 88% of the population live under 
authoritarian regimes, many of which rely on oil or mineral rents, that enable the 
government to survive.41 Nearly 29% of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
oil exporters.42 If the authoritarian regime literature concludes that single-party states are 
more likely to provide public goods than personalist regimes, do natural resources—which 
allow the regimes insulation from the population—change that arithmetic? Would oil 
revenue in particular allow for personalist regimes to be more likely to provide public 
goods than single-party states?  
I also focus in particular on authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-
Saharan Africa features dozens of authoritarian regimes that frequently suffer from the 
notorious resource curse. Sub-Saharan Africa also will also be home to nearly half of the 
world population within the century, so the nature of human development that occurs in 
Africa in the coming years will be very important for humanity at large. My study therefore 
focuses on two different types of authoritarian regimes in two oil-producing states in Africa 
—Chad and Gabon.  
I develop three hypotheses to examine how different types of oil-producing 
authoritarian regimes deliver public goods. The hypotheses focus specifically on 
mechanisms related to the incentives of the ruling elite to deliver public goods to their 
populations.  
 
41 “Sub-Saharan Africa,” Freedom House, accessed November 29th, 2019, 
https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa.  
42 “Atlas of Economic Complexity” Growth Lab at Harvard University, accessed December 8th, 2019. 
http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/ 
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H1: Single-party states should perform better at public goods distribution than 
personalist dictators. Single-party states will provide more public goods because their 
survival strategy will likely incorporate public goods to maintain their diverse and inclusive 
winning coalitions. Personalist regimes will prioritize coercion as a survival strategy and 
spend less on public goods.  
H2: Leaders in single-party states have a longer time horizon than personalist 
dictators, which provides a higher level of public goods distribution. The more durable the 
regime, the more the regime is likely to engage in the distribution of public goods. Longer 
time horizons lead to a lower reliance upon coercive goods and more spending on public 
goods. Personalist regimes are less likely to have a long time horizon compared to party 
regimes since the personalist regime collapses with the death or absence of the leader, and 
therefore personalist regimes will likely have shorter time horizons and prioritize on 
coercive goods over public goods.  
H3: Oil rents improve public goods distribution in single-party states, while in 
personalist regimes it has a negligible effect due to the primary focus of regime survival. 
Single-party states use their oil profits to invest into public goods that ultimately improve 
human development. Personalist regimes will focus their oil profits on repressive public 
goods such as security and military assets to prevent another armed coup similar to the one 
which brought them into power.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To investigate these hypotheses, I conduct a comparative case study with two 
similar cases that differ on the key independent variable of interest: authoritarian regime 
type. Chad and Gabon are both oil-rich African states with different types of authoritarian 
regimes. A significant difference that I use as my independent variable is their government 
structure. According to GWF’s authoritarian regime index, Gabon is a classified as a 
single-party state, led by the Gabonese Democratic Party, who have ruled since its 
independence from France. Chad is classified as a civilian personalist state, currently ruled 
by Idriss Déby, who took over in a coup against the former President Habré in 1990.  
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The overall expectation emerging from the hypotheses above is that the personalist 
regimes in Chad will focus primarily on coercion and less on development. Conversely, 
the Gabonese Democratic Party single-party state, which can maintain the regime through 
a systematic succession of executives through the party, will invest in the state and in public 
goods provision. The two countries’ trajectories on the Human Development Index have 
diverged in recent decades. Gabon has a human development score of 0.702 at 110th place 
out of 189 countries, while Chad, at 186th place, has an HDI of 0.404.43 Chad and Gabon 
also have widely different literacy rates with Chad’s at 22% and Gabon’s at 82.3%. Such 
differences in human development indicators provide an initial proxy to the concept of 
public goods provision, illustrating that Gabon does indeed appear to be delivering more 
public goods than Chad.  
Typically, the more a state invests in public goods, the higher its human 
development indicators will be. Health and education outcomes are important components 
of overall measures of human development, like the United Nation’s Human Development 
Index. When governments spend more on public goods like health services, education, and 
infrastructure, their outcomes in areas such as life expectancy, literacy rates, and GDP are 
likely to become higher. For example, Gabon spends more per capita on education than the 
Sub-Saharan African average, and as a result features a higher literacy rate. Yet Gabon’s 
literacy rate, at 82% and spending on education per GDP at 2.7% is lower than the upper-
middle income state average, states with Gabon’s GDP per capita, who spend an average 
of 4.1% of GDP on education and feature a 99% literacy rate.44  
Both Gabon and Chad are ethnically diverse countries with no majority ethnic 
group. Both have had regional unstable neighbors. Chad faces regional instability through 
the Darfur crisis in South Sudan, as well as through transnational terror groups around Lake 
Chad. Gabon has, at times, also faced instability from neighboring conflicts in Congo and 
Cameroon. Both countries were colonized by the French.  
 
43 “Human Development Index and its Components” United Nations Human Development Reports, 
accessed September 5th, 2019. http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. 
44 The World Bank, Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP), Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=XT&view=chart.  
15 
Both countries are oil producing states. Oil revenue has provided a majority of 
Gabon’s GDP, exports, and government revenue since Gabon began exportation early into 
its post-independence history. Gabon’s oil is extracted offshore, its reserves peaked in 
1997, and it has been diminishing ever since, to an estimated exhaustion around 2030. 
Moreover, Chad has only recently begun exporting oil in 2003, but since then, oil has 
dominated its exports and government revenue. Chad’s oil reserves are modest, located in 
the south of the country, and they will likely only last 25 more years.45 Both states feature 
elements of the resource curse.46  
My method is to examine the hypothesized relationships between the political 
mechanics of Gabon and Chad and their public goods distribution patterns. I focus in 
particular on human development and infrastructure outcomes, for which I use the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators including life expectancy, primary school 
enrollment, literacy rate, electric power consumption, rail lines, and military expenditure 
(% of government expenditure).47 For qualitative work, I look into published work by non-
governmental organizations, think tanks, local news, and government documents. For each 
country, I analyze the regime history and politics and how they relate to the distributional 
trends in these areas.  
The difficulty of data collection in authoritarian regimes is that they are not as open 
as democracies with sharing data on infrastructure and human development. Often, they 
will claim higher numbers to receive foreign aid and to boost legitimacy. Another difficulty 
is including the individuals who are far from the urban centers of public goods distribution 
and infrastructure. These subsistence agriculture villages are often not involved in the 
political process, and thus receive little goods. Since I am comparing two authoritarian 
45 The World Bank, Republic of Chad Poverty Notes: Dynamics of Poverty and Inequality following 
the Rise of the Oil Sector, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013. 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/201821468015589462/pdf/809350ESW0P1270Gray0cover00
PUBLICTD.pdf 
46 Douglas A. Yates, The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of 
Africa’s Natural Resources, (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 5. 
47 “Indicators” World Bank, accessed November 29th, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
16 
regimes, the possibility for inaccurate data is present in both countries, minimizing the 
threat of biasing the study.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE
My thesis addresses the question of whether and how different authoritarian regime
types provide different levels of public goods, by looking at Chad and Gabon in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The first chapter has introduced the research question, relevant literature, 
hypotheses, and research design. In the second chapter, I discuss Chad’s history of 
personalist regimes, provide an overview of trends in public goods provision, and analyze 
each of the three hypotheses outlined above. The third chapter repeats this exercise for 
Gabon and the Gabonese Democratic Party. In the final chapter, I summarize and compare 
the findings from each country study and reflect on the implications of the findings.  
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II. CHAD AND PERSONALISM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chad, an oil-exporting African state, has been ruled by three personalist leaders 
since its independence from France in 1960. Chad has one of the lowest human 
development ratings in the world, ranking 187 out of 189 according to the United Nations 
Human Development Index. However, under its latest leader, Idriss Déby, Chad has seen 
consistent investment into health, education, and infrastructure.  
I argue in this chapter that Chad has historically provided low levels of public goods 
because coercion has been the primary survival strategy under every Chadian personalist 
regime. In Chad, there is a linkage between the vulnerability of the personalist regime, its 
time horizons, and its prioritization of coercive versus public goods spending: the more 
vulnerable a regime is to violent threats, the more it prioritizes coercive goods, which 
crowds out public goods. Finally, growth of Chad’s oil revenue is linked to increased public 
goods investment, because oil provides the funds for public goods and strengthens the 
regime so it can prioritize public goods over coercive goods.  
I begin this chapter by describing continuity in Chad’s personalist leaders since its 
Independence in 1960. I then describe the low levels of public goods in Chad to include 
health, education, and infrastructure, and their improvements under Idriss Déby since 2000. 
Lastly, I investigate the three hypotheses relating to regime type, time horizon, and oil 
revenue to help explain why the regime provides the level of public goods it does.  
B. PERSONALIST REGIMES IN CHAD 
Chad has been ruled by a series of personalist leaders since its independence from 
France in 1960. The cycle started with N’Garta Tombalbaye, who transformed Chad’s 
largest political party at independence into his own personalist party. Subsequent leaders 
took over Chad through guerilla armies and would also maintain personalist regimes. All 
three regimes fit Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s definition of a personalist authoritarian 
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regime, where one person centers power and leadership decisions on themselves.48 In this 
section, I briefly describe each personalistic regime.  
1. Tombalbaye  
 Chad’s independence leader and first president, N’Garta Tombalbaye, 
started a personalist cycle of rule when he transformed what had previously been an 
organized political party into his own personalist regime. Before Chad’s independence in 
1960, Tombalbaye started as a member of the strongest political party in Chad, the Chadian 
Progressive Party (PPT). Tombalbaye became a leader in the party, eventually rising to 
prime minister. Upon Chad’s independence in 1960, Tombalbaye and the party adopted a 
constitution with a presidential system, with himself as president.49 He consolidated 
personalistic control over the party by removing his rivals from the party and country.50 
He then outlawed all other political parties, solidifying his authoritarian rule.  
Tombalbaye then tried to extend his power by violently suppressing and extracting 
taxes from the northern Muslim population, who were independent, even under French 
colonial rule. Tombalbaye’s efforts were met in 1966 with a violent rebellion in the north 
and, later, with turmoil among his own supporters. The northern rebellion formed an 
umbrella organization, Front national de liberation du Tchad (FROLINAT), that united 
three separate armies, each backed by different client neighbor states: Sudan; Libya; and 
Nigeria.51 Tombalbaye meanwhile continued his efforts to centralize his power via purges 
of possible rivals within the party and the military.52 In 1975, in response to his purges his 
own tribe killed him in a coup that brought a military junta to power.53 The junta would 
rule for a few years before losing to a FROLINAT army in a civil war. Thus, Chad’s first 
 
48 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, How Dictatorships Work (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 9. 
49 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad (Berkeley: Institute of International 
Studies, 1981), 23. 
50 Thompson and Adloff, 23. 
51 Thompson and Adloff, 50. 
52 Mario Joaquim Azevedo and U. Nnadozie Emmanuel, Chad: A Nation in Search of Its Future, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 50. 
53 Azevedo and Emmanuel, 50. 
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independent ruler personalized the state by centralizing the government around himself, 
but in his efforts to remove all rivals, he failed and paid with his life.  
2. Habré  
Tombalbaye’s death left a fractured Chad in a civil war, which was eventually won 
by guerilla army leader Hissène Habré. After Tombalbaye was removed by a military junta 
in 1975, the conflict between FROLINAT and the Chadian government grew into a larger 
civil war. Hissène Habré, one of the FROLINAT leaders, became prime minister of the 
junta government as a compromise with the junta to end the civil war in 1978.54 Habré led 
his FROLINAT faction to seize control of the capital, N’Djamena, in 1979 in a surprise 
betrayal against the junta government.55 This move plunged Chad into a new civil war 
between 1979 and 1982, which Habré subsequently won by conquering every major town, 
eventually establishing his own personalist regime.56  
Like Tombalbaye, Habré spent his reign, between 1982 and 1990, trying to 
consolidate power through a variety of political and coercive means. Leveraging a common 
tactic for personalist regimes, Habré formed his own political party, the National Union for 
Independence and Revolution (UNIR).57 Habré likewise created a constitution that gave 
his office, the presidency, the power to change the constitution at will, legally cementing 
his personalist rule.58 When his political rivals undermined his rule, by supporting 
secession movements and fermenting rebellion, Habré responded with coercive means -- 
violence, torture, and killings -- to purge his government of other influences and further 
entrench his personalist rule.59 Instead of co-opting his rivals with public services or 
patronage, Habré used his powerful security services to repress the population, leading to 
 
54 Azevedo and Emmanuel, Chad, 53. 
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56 Azevedo and Emmanuel, Chad, 56. 
57 Azevedo and Emmanuel. Chad, 46. 
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Scarecrow Press, 1997), 20. 
20 
an estimated 40,000 killed under his rule.60 As with Tombalbaye, Habré’s heavy-
handedness alienated his supporters, with the result that Idriss Déby, his army chief of staff 
ousted Habré in a coup backed by Libya in 1990.  
3. Déby  
Idris Déby replaced Hissène Habré in 1990 as yet another personalist leader of 
Chad. The overthrow was facilitated by Déby’s guerilla army and movement, the 
Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), or the Patriotic Salvation Movement, which later 
became the leading political party in Chad.61 Déby, who was Habré’s Army Chief of Staff, 
seized power from Habré, at an opportune moment with direct external support from Sudan 
and neutral support from France, which had earlier supported Habré but ultimately did not 
intervene to save him. Habré had lost support from internal factions and from France 
because of his violent repression towards political dissidents and rival ethnic factions. Déby 
initially led a failed coup in 1989 when Habré was vulnerable. Afterwards, Déby regrouped 
in the Darfur region of Sudan, and with support from Sudan’s dictator, El-Bashir, he 
formed the MPS guerilla movement which took the capital of N’Djamena in 1990.62  
Déby, however, found himself in a vulnerable position; he was surrounded by the 
same threats Habré faced: externally supported armies and revolts from within. 
Nevertheless, Déby would go on to create the most stable personalist regime in Chad to 
date; he built coalitions with multiparty elections, deescalated rebel armies, and 
counterbalanced security services to avoid coups.63  
Today, Déby maintains an effective security apparatus that counterbalances itself, 
lowering the risk of coups by filling the leadership positions with his close family members. 
The Chadian Army, which often fights external foes in support of UN and French missions, 
is counterbalanced by both the Nomadic National Guard, a unit that operates in the 
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hinterlands, and the Direction Générale des Services de Sécurité et des Institutions de 
l’Etat, DGSSIE, a presidential guard. Déby’s main ethnic group, the Bari in the Muslim 
north, initially supported his armed revolt and presidency. However, Déby has shifted 
control of the security services away from being ethnic-based towards personal familial 
ties, which has helped him stabilize the regime to avoid a coup and rebellion from his 
former ethnic supporters the Bari.64 A typical personalist tactic is to use a small loyal 
support base to form your security services, and members of Déby’s family lead the 
DGSSIE, the National Nomadic Guard, and the Military Intelligence units.65 Both the 
Nomadic National Guard and DGSSIE are better funded and equipped than the Army, as 
Déby ensures that the best trained and equipped forces are under his familial leadership.66  
Thus, Déby counterbalances each of the armed forces, so that no group can 
overthrow him in a coup. As a result, Déby is not as vulnerable from internal threats as his 
predecessors. In addition, Déby’s co-optation of rival elites and political tactics have kept 
state violence and repression at lower levels than under Habré’s rule.67 Déby both created 
a strong military to defeat rebellions and counterbalanced it so that he can survive coups; 
all these efforts strengthen the regime, which has, as of 2020, lasted 30 years.  
C. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC GOODS IN CHAD 
Throughout its independent history, Chad’s leaders have typically invested little 
into public goods provision. Following independence, Chad experienced very little 
infrastructure development. Chad had few roads and no railroads. Likewise, there were 
very few hospitals, and the few Chad had were run by the French well until the late 20th 
century.68 Health and education also suffer from this lack of transport infrastructure and 
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facilities. Overall, Chad ranks at 187 out of 189 on the United Nations Human 
Development Index.69 Nearly 96% of Chadians live in poverty, defined by The World 
Bank as living on less than $5.50 a day at 2011 international prices.70 The vast majority of 
those in poverty are the 87% of Chadians who live in rural areas compared to the 13% in 
cities; for example, only one in five in N’Djamena live in poverty.71  
However, public investment has grown under the Déby regime. Before Déby, the 
overall Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was $270, which had not changed much 
since independence.72 After Déby took over Chad in 1990 and consolidated power, his 
government set out poverty reduction strategies with multinational organizations to address 
some of these issues. There has been a corresponding trend of public goods investment in 
Chad following the year 2000. This section briefly describes these trends in the areas of 
infrastructure, health and education. 
1. Infrastructure 
One major barrier to public goods provision for Chad’s rural population is the lack 
of infrastructure; for decades, infrastructure was neglected, but since 2000, there has been 
greater investment in this area. In the year 2000, the road network in Chad only covered 
40,000 kilometers (km), with only about 300 km paved. This inadequate road network 
hampers economic growth, especially for the rural population, who operate 80% of the 
economy, consisting of agriculture and livestock exports.73 Farmers and merchants cannot 
freely transport their goods and they pay an increased cost to transport their goods to 
market, both within Chad and abroad.74  
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Since 2000, Déby has allocated most of Chad’s public investments to infrastructure. 
Public investment in infrastructure and public works were 30% of state expenditures under 
the regime’s poverty reduction strategies in the 2000s.75 Between 2001 and 2009, Chad 
spent nearly 57% of its investment budget on physical infrastructure, compared to 11% on 
security services, demonstrating the priority the Déby regime places on infrastructure and 
the future compounding growth that infrastructure can bring.76 During road development 
programs from 2002 to 2006, paved roads grew by 80%, from 560 km to 1000 km in 2006 
and to 1602 km in 2011.77 Due to the large rural population of Chad, infrastructure is the 
primary factor in delivering public goods to the population.  
2. Health  
Healthcare in Chad is a serious problem: the primary obstacle is access to health 
for the largely rural population, and the secondary obstacle is the limited number of health 
professionals in the country. Health is an area of public services in which the government 
has not improved much, health professionals tend to focus on the Chadian cities, leaving 
the rural population with limited access. As a result, Chad has one of the highest maternal 
mortality rate among African countries, with 827 maternal mortalities per 100,000 live 
births in 1997, which increased to 860 per 100,000 live births in 2015.78 Chad has only 1 
doctor for every 27,680 people and 1 midwife for every 9,074 people, which fails to meet 
the WHO standards of: 1 doctor for every 10,000 people and 1 midwife for every 5,000 
people. Additionally, 46% of doctors are in N’Djamena alone.79 Consequently, the average 
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Chadian must travel 14 km to reach a health facility, and that distance increases for the 
rural population to 18 km in the north a 16 km in the south.80  
However, there has been some improvement in the provision of health services. For 
example, mortality of children under five in 2018 was Chad’s lowest in documented history 
at 119 per 1,000, down from 194 per 1,000 in 1997.81 However, in relation to GDP, Chad 
spends around 1% on health, which is low compared to other developing states (around 
2%).82 Until access to heath for the rural population increases in the form of more health 
clinics, more doctors, and better transportation infrastructure, Chadians will continue to 
have limited access to health goods.  
3. Education  
Education is a sector in which Chad has spent considerable effort and seen growth, 
passing its own poverty reduction goals. Primary school enrollment rose from 20% in 1960 
to 99% in 2009.83 From 2001 to 2005, education rates were growing 6.3% a year, with 
gross primary enrollment rate increasing from 71% in 2000 to 84.4% in 2005, and with 
rates for girls specifically growing from 54.7% in 2000 to 67.9% in 2005.84 These rates 
surpassed Chad’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy 1 goals.85 Likewise, literacy rates 
grew from 11% in 1993 to 34% in 2009.86 Public spending on education grew from 10% 
in 2002 to 14% in 2005.87 Yet, at 2.4%, of GDP like health, education receives a lower 
portion of public spending than defense or infrastructure, and also lower than the Sub-
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Saharan African average of 3–4% of GDP.88 Based on this data, primary education 
improvement practices in Chad are working.  
As I will explain in the following section, Chad’s recent growth in public goods is 
the product of a change in personalist regime stability and survival tactics, longer time 
horizons of the regime, and the emergence of Chadian oil revenue in 2003.  
D. HYPOTHESIS 1: PERSONALIST SURVIVAL TACTICS AND PUBLIC 
GOODS 
The first hypothesis relates to which of two regimes types, single-party and 
personalist, is more likely to invest in and deliver public goods and services. Generally, 
speaking, the personalist leaders in Chad have not relied on public goods to stay in power, 
as coercion has been the primary survival strategy for all three leaders. France has 
subsidized coercion in Chad with direct military intervention. As a result, there has been, 
overall, little public goods investment by Chadian personalist regimes; however, as 
described above, public goods provision has changed to some extent under Idriss Déby.  
1. Coercion as a Primary Survival Strategy  
The primary survival strategy of Chad’s first President, N’Garta Tombalbaye was 
coercion, public goods were not a survival strategy. Tombalbaye spent significant capital 
and effort on subjugating the northern half of Chad, which had been autonomous under 
French colonial rule. His coercion efforts led to a violent uprising with the formation of 
rebel armies under FROLINAT.89 His response was more coercion, with assistance from 
the French military, which would subsidize the coercive approaches of all of Chad’s 
personalist leaders.90 When Tombalbaye received backlash from his own support group, 
the southern, Christian Sara population, he used coercion to jail and remove any voices of 
dissension within the military and his party, to include the army chief of staff.91 
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Tombalbaye’s heavy-handedness alienated his own ethnic support base, which murdered 
him in a coup. Instead of building a coalition and providing goods to the populace, 
Tombalbaye chose to use coercion to repress the north, and against his own support group.  
After the fall of Tombalbaye, Chad’s second personalist leader Hissène Habré, a 
FROLINAT rebel army leader, used coercion to take power and to maintain his regime; 
public goods were not a factor for his regime’s survival. Since he presided over Chad 
during conflict and civil war, Habré utilized coercion to repress guerilla movements and 
other rebel armies.92 He used violence and torture, and purged his government of any rivals 
or dissidents.93 Like Tombalbaye, instead of building coalitions and distributing the few 
goods Chad had, Habré resorted to coercion to maintain his regime, with an estimated 
40,000 killed during his rule.94  
Idris Déby, Chad’s third personalist leader, took power after he ousted Hissène 
Habré with a rebel army. Déby, like his predecessors, has used coercion as his primary 
survival strategy. Like Habré, Déby has faced violent threats from guerrilla armies, and he 
has used coercion to defeat them, along with assistance from the French military.95 Unlike 
Tombalbaye and Habré, Déby has been able to effectively deescalate rebel armies with 
patronage: he brings rivals into his administration as either ministers, Army officers, or 
special advisers with generous benefits.96 Yet, even with a stronger patronage network, in 
2008, he was almost ousted by a large rebel army that nearly took the capital, 
N’Djamena.97 Therefore, despite the patronage network, Déby’s primary survival strategy 
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is coercion; Déby also represses media outlets, political rivals, and critics of the regime.98 
Even though Déby uses coercion to a lesser extent than his predecessors which allows him 
to provide more public goods, coercion is still the bedrock of his regime survival, which 
prevents further public goods distribution.  
2. Erratic Public Goods Investments in Chadian Personalist Regimes  
Due to Chadian leaders use of coercion to maintain power, there have been limited 
cases where Chadian regimes have invested in public goods. Initially, Tombalbaye and the 
PPT instituted five-year development plans, originally in agriculture and livestock 
production, to improve exports and revenues, as well as road development.99 But this 
public investment was limited by a lack of revenue and Tombalbaye’s prioritization of 
coercion to centralize power.  
Habré, on the other hand, invested all resources into coercion to survive. He even 
extracted resources out of the state-owned enterprises and looted national treasures to fight 
the civil wars.100 There is no available data on public goods provision during Habré’s 
regime, which is a sign that he did not prioritize public goods.  
The Déby regime has more consistently invested in public goods, especially since 
the beginning of Chad’s oil exportation in 2003. This public goods improvement came 
from a combination of oil funds and the Déby regime’s status a more stable regime with a 
longer time horizon, explained in the following sections.  
3. Hypothesis 1 Summary 
All three of Chad’s personalist leaders have primarily used coercion to become 
leaders and to stay in power. Personalism as a regime type lends itself heavily to coercion 
over public goods as a survival strategy. That is because the personalist leaders are more 
concerned than single-party regimes with being violently overthrown, since losing power 
usually means losing their lives, whereas single-party states are more likely to negotiate 
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and bargain a regime transition, instead of violent collapse.101 Moreover, personalist 
regimes seldom rely upon public goods, because to do so as a survival strategy would 
require them to coalition-build, and in doing so they weaken their centralization of power. 
Déby, on the other hand, still uses coercion as his primary survival strategy, yet finds a 
unique balance – rare in Chadian personalist regimes –between coercion and provision of 
public goods. As long as coercion is the bedrock of the Chadian personalist regimes, 
however, public goods provision will remain relatively low. 
E. HYPOTHESIS 2: TIME HORIZONS AND PUBLIC GOODS 
The second hypothesis predicts that leaders in personalist regimes distribute fewer 
public goods than single-party regimes because they have shorter time horizons, which 
leads to lower levels of investment in public goods. Personalist regimes suffer from shorter 
time horizons than single-party states because their regimes center on an individual, which 
makes a regime more brittle. Unlike single-party states, where a coalition of elites can 
maintain the regime after a leader’s passing, if a leader of a personalistic regime dies or is 
absent, the regime may collapse. Chad’s personalist leaders have accordingly had short 
time horizons, particularly as they have faced unpredictable threats of extraconstitutional 
removal. Their reliance upon coercion weakens political dialogue and coalition formation, 
instead creating a vulnerable regime that has traded long term stability for short term 
security, leading to a cycle of coercive survival strategies, instability, and low levels of 
investment into public goods. As I discuss in more detail below, the importance of time 
horizons in Chad flows from the unpredictable and often violent nature of political threats, 
which leads to greater investment in private coercive goods. These dynamics are evident 
from differences in public goods provision between the regimes of Habré and Déby, where 
Habré, in the face of intense threats to his political survival, had very short time horizons 
and provided few public goods. Déby, on the other hand, has minimized such threats, 
leading him to longer time horizons and more consistent public goods investment.  
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1. Time Horizon, Regime Vulnerability, and Public Goods 
All of Chad’s leaders have ruled in a context of high regime vulnerability, leading 
to short time horizons. Hissène Habré had the shortest time horizon, from 1982–1990, as 
well as the most vulnerable regime, and therefore the lowest investment in public goods. 
Habré’s regime was vulnerable to not only external armies supported by Sudan and Libya 
but also enemies from within. Internal threats were serious; his successor, Idriss Déby, was 
Habré’s army chief of staff. Habré was vulnerable during the entirety of his rule.  
As described in the previous section, Habré’s response to this vulnerability was to 
invest in coercion to maintain control. Figure 1 denotes Chad’s military expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP, which ranged from 4.7% to 5.25% during Habré’s years, far higher 
than the 2.5% to 3.8% Sub-Saharan African average.102 Habré’s military expenditure 
indicates that as a result of his vulnerability Habré prioritized coercive goods, and public 
goods investment suffered. There is minimal data of public goods during Habré’s rule,  
but Chad’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita did not grow, instead it hovered around 
$200, while the Sub-Saharan African GNI per capita grew during this same period 
averaging $650.103 Therefore, despite data deficiencies on actual public goods distribution, 
Habré’s rule was almost certainly the period in Chad with the least investment into  
public goods.  
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Figure 1. Military Expenditure (% of GDP) Chad and Sub-Saharan Africa 
1964–2018.104 
By contrast, Idriss Déby’s rule is unique in Chad because even though he has faced 
similar threats as his predecessors, he has managed these threats with a more diverse set of 
tools, leading to less vulnerability and longer time horizons from extraconstitutional 
removal, and therefore higher investment into public goods. First, it is clear from Figure 1 
that Déby, especially since 2005, has invested to a significant extent in the military. The 
increased military expenditures are due to not only regime insecurity, such as a new civil 
war that culminated in 2008, but also because Chad was engaged in more regional military 
adventures in Central African Republic and in Mali, and in countering Boko Haram and 
other Violent Extremist Organizations in the Lake Chad Basin. However, prior to 2005, 
 




military spending in Chad as a portion of GDP shrank, from its peak of 2.3% in 1993 to a 
trough of 0.8% in 2005, even as oil profits began in 2003. Only after Déby’s regime faced 
a short time horizon because of new rebel armies did he increase military spending to its 
peak in 2008.105 Afterwards, once the threat was dealt with and his time horizon relatively 
secure, he lowered military spending again.  
Second, Déby introduced multiparty elections, which have allowed former guerilla 
army leaders to form opposition parties. Thus, instead of only waging war against the 
regime, they can compete politically.106 Elections, though they have not been very 
competitive, have therefore allowed Déby to became less vulnerable since he can co-opt 
his rivals instead of defeating them on the battlefield, which would prioritize coercive 
goods.107  
Third, Déby has been effective at negotiating with and disarming his rivals using 
patronage. Déby brings political rivals and rebel armies under his regime, offering them 
official positions in government as a minister, special advisor, or commissions within the 
Chadian Army. He even incorporates the soldiers of the rebel armies, giving them positions 
as enlisted soldiers within the Chadian Army.108  
Since both elections and patronage have helped the Déby regime to reduce its 
vulnerability, it has lengthened his time horizon, leading to greater prioritization of public 
goods investment. Under Déby, public investment has grown, and not only from oil 
exports. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, before the beginning of oil exports in 2003 
in Chad, primary school enrollment consistently grew from 46% in 1995 to 72% in 
2003.109 This trend suggest that Déby’s regime was less vulnerable and thus lowered its 
spending on coercive goods, allowing public goods to receive more consistent investment.  
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2. Hypothesis 2 Summary 
Every leader in Chad has been vulnerable to unpredictable extraconstitutional 
removal. This vulnerability has shortened the time horizons of the regimes and damaged 
the necessary stability for public goods distribution. The extent of their vulnerability has 
affected their ability to invest in public goods. The clearest contrast exists between Habré 
and Déby. Habré was the most vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal and so he 
prioritized coercive goods for most of his regime, leaving little resources for public goods. 
Déby became less vulnerable with his governance and allowed coercive goods to wane and 
public goods to grow, until a threat arose and he quickly increased spending on coercive 
goods to meet the threat. But after Déby beat back a rebel army in 2008, he shifted priorities 
again, back to public goods investment. The less vulnerable the regime is, the more it can 
spend less on coercive goods and allow public goods distribution.  
F. HYPOTHESIS 3: OIL REVENUE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
The third hypothesis predicts that oil rents in personalist regimes have a negligible 
effect on public goods because the regime will focus primarily on survival, therefore they 
prioritize spending the revenue on coercive goods. Oil was discovered in Chad in 1950, 
but it was not extracted and sold until 2003.110 Oil in Chad is therefore a recent 
phenomenon, beginning thirteen years into Déby’s regime. Oil has had two effects on 
Chad’s political regime that have brought about greater investment in public goods. First, 
it directly funds public goods, and second, it strengthens the Déby regime, which allows 
the regime to lower their spending on coercive goods and further invest into public goods. 
By 2014, oil provided 30% of Chad’s GDP and 70% of its government budget revenue.111 
Oil allows Déby to have a larger patronage network, which allows him to co-opt opponents, 
avoiding costly combat, and to build coalitions.  
Oil funds public goods in Chad; it has generated most of government revenue since 
2003 and has led to the spike in Chad’s spending on health, education, and infrastructure. 
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With the budget growth from oil, Chad initially allocated 70% of public spending to 
poverty reduction from the oil accounts, but this was reduced to 65% in 2007, due to 
rebellion threats and the corresponding increase in security funding.112 Chad’s recent oil 
revenue grew health spending from $18 per person in 2003 to $44 in 2014, a 2.5-fold 
improvement.113 Similarly, in education, gross primary school enrollment grew from 71% 
in 2003 to 100% in 2014.114 Figures 2, 3, and 4 depicts the strong relationship between 
oil-led GDP growth between 2003 and 2014 and a similar growth in Chad’s health 
expenditure per capita and primary school enrollment during those same years. After 2014, 
there is a similar drop in oil prices, Chad’s GDP, and public goods. Another indicator of 
the strong relationship between oil revenue and public goods is that when oil prices drop, 
so does public goods investment.  
 
Figure 2. Chad’s GDP Per Capita (current US$) 2000–2019.115 
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Figure 3. Chad’s Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US$), 
2000–2017.116 
 
Figure 4. Chad’s Primary School Enrollment, 1990–2015.117 
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Oil also has a stabilizing effect on the regime. Oil allows Déby to fund an extensive 
patronage network that has helped to deescalate armed rivals from continuing aggression. 
With oil funding, Déby can not only pay off the leader of a rebel army with a lucrative 
government position but also pay off his soldiers.118 Déby’s oil-funded patronage network 
allows him to coalition build, to deescalate violence and therefore entrench his regime. Oil 
revenue both provides funds for public goods and improves the stability of the regime, 
allowing it to use those funds to invest in public goods.  
Oil exports provided the Déby regime resources to invest in public goods and 
provide regime stability, creating an environment for more public goods spending. It assists 
the Déby regime to deescalate violence, and directly funds public goods like health, 
education, and infrastructure. Even though public goods spending decreases with lower oil 
prices, the stability that the regime faces with oil, allows consistent public goods 
distribution.  
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 Chad’s personalist regimes that have ruled since 1960 have provided low levels of 
public goods due to the primacy of coercion as their survival strategy. Each personalist 
leader in Chad relied upon coercion to become the leader, and to survive in office. The 
more vulnerable the regime was to violent extraconstitutional removal, the shorter their 
time horizons, and the more they focused on investments in coercive goods. Public goods, 
which are costly, and do not remove rivals, were not a priority for Chad’s more vulnerable 
leaders. The introduction of oil has strengthened the Déby regime by allowing him to fund 
a larger patronage network. Oil has also allowed the regime to consistently invest more 
into public goods. The stronger the Déby regime is, the more it will invest into public goods 
instead of coercive goods.  
 
 
118 Tubiana and Debos, 7. 
36 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
37 
III. GABON AND THE SINGLE-PARTY STATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Gabon, an oil-exporting African state, has maintained the same single-party regime 
since its independence from France in 1960. Thanks to its oil revenues, Gabon has one of 
the highest per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa, placing it as an upper-middle income 
country. Gabon provides more funding per capita for health and education, than the Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) average, and considerably more than Chad. Gabon also has a higher 
life expectancy, literacy rate, and access to electricity than the SSA average, though it does 
not effectively develop its roads or rails, where it has the same road density as Chad.  
I argue in this chapter that Gabon’s level of public goods provision, which I classify 
as moderate given its high GDP per capita, is a function of the fact that the Bongo family 
and the PDG rely only moderately on public goods to stay in power. Instead, the regime 
relies upon other survival strategies such as patronage, election rigging, coercion, and 
international support. These survival strategies have kept the regime safe from 
extraconstitutional removal, avoiding violence and turmoil. Since Gabon introduced 
multiparty elections in 1990, its time horizons have become synced with the election cycle. 
Unlike in Chad, however, these shortened time horizons have led to the party’s greater 
reliance on public goods to survive, suggesting an important difference between 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized threats to power. Finally, there is a strong 
linkage between growth in Gabon’s oil revenue and a growth in public goods. The inverse 
is also true: public goods suffer when oil revenues drop.  
I begin this chapter by describing the authoritarian regime of the Gabonese 
Democratic Party (PDG) and the Bongo dynasty, who have ruled as its Presidents. I then 
provide an overview of public goods in Gabon, to include health and education. Lastly, I 
investigate the three hypotheses: regime type, time horizon, and oil’s impact on why the 
regime provides the level of public goods it does.  
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B. GABONESE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OVERVIEW 
Gabon has been ruled by an authoritarian regime since its independence from 
France in 1960. The regime began when the first president, Leon Mba, used repression to 
push out other parties and opposition leaders.119 In 1968, his successor, Omar Bongo, 
outlawed all parties except his own Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG), which would 
become the state’s single-party. The PDG has continued to rule even after 1990 when 
multiparty elections were instituted.120 From 1990 onwards, Omar Bongo, and later, his 
son Ali Bongo, would lead the PDG to dominate elections and keep the regime in power 
using survival strategies such as coercion, vote-rigging, international support, patronage, 
and public goods.  
The PDG fits most definitions of a single-party regime definition, such as those 
argued by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, Charron and Lapuente, as well as Gandhi and 
Przeworski and discussed in Chapter 1. Specifically, the party’s use of repression, its elite 
unity, extensive patronage networks, and its integration with civil society are all consistent 
with the concept of a single party regime. The PDG is a broad, ethnically diverse, and 
geographically inclusive.121 Most civil society groups in Gabon are a part of the PDG; for 
example, all women’s groups, youth groups, and trade unions are appendages of the 
party.122 Moreover, Gabon’s elites have been to some extent united under the PDG as its 
clients, in a large patron-client network.  
Gabon is not only ruled as a single-party state, it also embodies elements of 
personalism. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz label Gabon as a party-personalist regime.123 For 
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most of the regime’s history, between 1968 and 2009, Gabon was ruled by Omar Bongo, 
and the party was united under his leadership. A significant amount of power was 
centralized under the office of the presidency.124 Omar Bongo held personal control of the 
Defense Minister position, and control of the presidential guard. The intelligence services 
were controlled by his close family members, like his son Ali Bongo.125 Omar Bongo was 
at the center of the party and its leadership decisions, and upon his death in 2009, without 
his unifying presence, the party split into factions. When the party picked Ali Bongo to 
become the party’s nominee for president, a rival faction within the party, called the 
“barons,” defected to join and lead opposition movements, indicating that Omar Bongo’s 
personal power, not the party’s, was a key unifying force for the elites.126  
C. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC GOODS IN GABON 
Currently, Gabon provides goods at a moderate level, more than the Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) average, yet lower than states with similar GDP per capita levels. Gabon 
featured a much higher GDP per capita of $6,830 in 2018 compared to the SSA average of 
$1,517.127 Gabon’s higher GDP per capita, largely a result of its oil wealth and small 
population, ranks the country as an upper middle-income state. Gabon’s relatively high per 
capita GDP enables higher levels of spending on health and education than many of its 
SSA counterparts. However, Gabon has the resources for even more goods distribution, 
which is evident in their government spending as a proportion of GDP, which is lower than 
both the SSA average and the average for upper middle-income countries around the world. 
If Gabon invested in public goods at similar rates (as a proportion of GDP) as the SSA and 
upper middle-income countries, its population would enjoy considerably greater access to 
services like health and education.  
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1. Health 
Gabon provides more health goods than the SSA average but less than globally 
comparable upper-middle income states. Gabon’s life expectancy is 63, more than the SSA 
average of 60 and under the upper middle-income states’ average of 74.128 In 2017, 
Gabon’s health spending per capita was $217, higher than the SSA average of $83, but 
lower than the upper middle-income average of $459.129 Even though Gabon outspends 
the SSA average in dollars per capita, it spends far less as a percentage of its GDP; 2.7% 
in 2017 compared to the SSA average of 5.1%.130 If Gabon invested in health at a similar 
rate (as a proportion of GDP) as SSA, then its population would receive similar access to 
health as other upper-middle income states do.131 Thus, based on their spending per GDP, 
Gabon provides only a moderate level of health goods with the resources it has at its 
disposal.  
2. Education 
As with healthcare, Gabon spends less on education than its GDP per capita would 
expect based on relevant comparison between the SSA average and global upper middle-
income states. Gabon spends an average of $442 per student, compared to $693 in 
Botswana, an upper middle-income state, and more than Ghana, a lower middle-income 
state, at $282 per student.132 Gabon’s spending on education per GDP and government 
expenditure nearly match Chad’s rates: 2.7% versus 2.9% per GDP, and 11.4% versus 
12.5% of government expenditure.133 Gabon’s 2.7% per GDP falls short of the SSA 
average of 4.3% in 2014, and the upper middle income average of 4.1%.134 Gabon spends 
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proportionally less on education, but because of its high per capita income from oil, it still 
spends more than most SSA states and provides a literacy rate of 89%, higher than the SSA 
average of 65%, but short of the 99% of the upper middle income average.135 Similar to 
their health spending habits, Gabon has the resources to invest at a higher level in 
education.  
3. Infrastructure 
Gabon provides mixed levels of infrastructure as well. It provides much of its 
population with access to electricity, but roads and rail remain underdeveloped. In Gabon, 
93% of the population had access to electricity in in 2018, which nearly double the SSA 
average of 47% but just beneath the upper-middle income average of 99%.136 Gabon can 
achieve a high access to electricity due to its oil production, large hydroelectric potential, 
and its unusually high urbanization rate of 85%.137 In contrast, Gabon’s road and rail 
network is less developed than its neighbors: The Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and 
Central African Republic. Gabon’s road density is similar to Chad.138 Gabon’s road 
network is comprised of nearly 9,170 kilometers, with less than 11% of these being paved 
with asphalt, and less than 20% of the unpaved roads being in proper working condition.139  
As I will explain in the following section, Gabon’s moderate level of public goods 
provision is the product of the regime’s five survival strategies, and the emergence of 
multiparty elections that produce short time horizons forcing the regime to provide more 
goods to gain a winning coalition.  
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D. HYPOTHESIS 1: SINGLE-PARTY STATE SURVIVAL TACTICS AND 
PUBLIC GOODS 
The first hypothesis suggests that party regimes will distribute public goods at 
greater rates than personalist regimes because they are more inclusive, diverse, and 
responsive to their populace. The Bongo family and the PDG have relied to a moderate 
extent on public goods to stay in power in Gabon. This results in more public goods in 
Gabon than in Chad, where the regime relies even less on these goods to stay in power. 
However, as the previous section demonstrated, there are not as many public goods as there 
could be in Gabon given their level of economic wealth. This is because public goods are 
only one of five factors that the regime uses to stay in power. The PDG and the Bongo 
family have other survival strategies – namely, co-opting elites with a patronage jobs, 
election rigging, coercion, and international support. Historically, international support 
from the French has been one of the most important factors in maintaining the current 
regime in Gabon. Together, all of these survival strategies explain why Gabon does not 
provide public goods as much as they could. 
1. The PDG’s Elite-Focused Survival Strategies 
For most of Gabon’s history, the PDG has not relied upon the delivery of public 
goods to the population to stay in power; rather, they relied on private goods distributed to 
their elite patronage networks. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the party and Omar Bongo 
distributed private goods to elites within Gabon through lucrative positions within 
government and the party.140 After the PDG introduced multiparty elections in 1990, Omar 
Bongo expanded the PDG’s patronage network to include opposition party leaders.141 He 
also provided positions in his cabinet to elites from each ethnic group.142 Gabon is an 
ethnically diverse country, and this strategy helped him to unite different groups and gain 
their approval. Thus, Omar Bongo’s survival strategy focused to a greater extent on the 
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distribution of private benefits to elites rather than on building grassroots support among 
party members.  
Bongo also rewarded loyalty from his supporters. Bongo and the party would direct 
government goods and services to their loyal supporters, as a form of clientelism.143 An 
example of this behavior is the Trans-Gabon railway. It was originally designed to connect 
the port cities on the west coast to the iron deposits in the east, but Omar Bongo diverted 
the project towards his home region, so that he secure the loyalty from his Téké ethnic 
group.144 This project took priority over all other public investment; it took 14 years and 
cost four times the original estimate.145 Omar Bongo prioritized and rewarded his small 
ethnic group to form a strong, loyal support base whom he could trust with positions of 
power. A large majority of the military and its leadership have been and continue to be 
Téké men.146 Since the Téké are dependent on the Bongo dynasty for private goods, they 
are committed enough to the regime’s survival to staff and lead the security services. 
The PDG under the leadership of Bongo’s son, Ali Bongo, who gained power in 
2009, has relied more on the distribution of public goods to survive than they did under his 
father, Omar, because Ali has not been able to rely on the previously strong patronage 
network that united the elites within the party. Before Ali Bongo took over as president, he 
was the head of the “renovators” faction within the party, a faction that was more 
technocratic and desired to divest from oil and invest in the people.147 The opposing 
faction to the “renovators” in the party, the “barons,” did not unite behind Ali Bongo when 
he became President. Instead, many of the “barons” defected in order to join or start new 
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opposition parties.148 These strong elites posed greater challenges to Ali Bongo than those 
his father faced.149 Additionally, as I discuss at greater length below, by 2009, Gabon’s oil 
revenues were shrinking, having hit their peak in 1997. Oil’s diminishing returns gave Ali 
Bongo and the party fewer resources to fund the patronage network.150  
In response to the increased pressure of a shrunken patronage network and more 
challenges from Gabon’s elites, Ali Bongo and the PDG publicly prioritized public goods 
to stay in power. They launched a new public investment plan, Gabon Emergent, soon after 
Ali became president. The plan’s goals were to diversify Gabon’s economy away from oil, 
expand access to healthcare, improve human capital, and increase infrastructure.151 From 
2010 – 2014, Ali Bongo and the party used oil profits to fund the Gabon Emergent public 
goods projects, spending 11.4% of GDP on public investment in 2012 at the highest, 
compared to the average of 5% in 2015, after oil prices dropped.152 Ali Bongo used public 
goods projects within Gabon Emergent to gain support from opposition strongholds, 
promising them hydroelectric plants.153 During Ali Bongo’s time as president, public 
funding of health insurance for the poor also improved under a new program.154 These 
actions to increase public goods by Ali and the party likely served to increase his broad 
appeal, and thus, his chances of remaining in power.  
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2. Public Goods and Local Leader Support 
The PDG’s accountability to elites during Omar Bongo’s leadership was typically 
in the form of patronage, and with the addition of multiparty elections in 1990, elites 
outside the party could form opposition movements for better bargaining position. After 
Ali Bongo took over in 2009, more party elites, especially from the “baron” faction, 
defected to form opposition movements and gain private goods. For these elites, elections 
were a competition of patronage, where jobs and resources were given out in exchange for 
political support, oil, timber, or manganese export control.155 When former party elites 
defected and formed their own opposition parties, it was partially in an attempt to 
renegotiate for more patronage, after which they would either rejoin the party, or the 
coalition of parties.156  
The party also negotiates with local leaders and party members to garner their 
support ahead of elections. Before the legislative elections in 2011, the prime minister went 
on tour to local districts to gather support for the PDG. The negotiations centered on getting 
Gabon Emergent public goods projects funded, otherwise the local village leaders would 
throw their support behind opposition groups instead.157  
There are even instances of Omar Bongo promising to pay the poor’s electricity 
bills to get their votes.158 In another example, Omar Bongo sent in his 1998 campaign 
manager run to Libreville, the capital, in order to improve roads and infrastructure, a 
primary concern of the population. This was likely done to gain more votes and support, 
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and since the effort was successful, Omar gained popularity in Libreville.159 Ali Bongo 
and the PDG have continued this behavior; they directly hand out tools, food, and furniture 
to village leaders and party activists to obtain their support.160  
3. Other Survival Strategies: International Support, Coercion, and Vote 
Rigging  
The Bongo dynasty and the party do not rely solely on public goods distribution to 
stay in power. They have also relied on French involvement, coercion, and vote rigging at 
various times since independence. These alternative survival mechanisms relieve pressure 
on the regime to distribute public goods. 
Historically, the regime has relied to a large extent on the French government to 
maintain its power. France would support the regime through aid, grants, loan relief, 
certifying the legitimacy of Gabon’s elections, and even coercion.161 France’s role in 
keeping Omar Bongo in power became clear following the murder of an opposition 
member and subsequent mass uprisings in the 1990s. The French Army’s rapid reaction 
battalion, stationed near Libreville, intervened to support the regime, they stopped the riots 
and restored order. Douglas Yates, scholar of Gabonese history, notes that Omar Bongo 
would have been overthrown if it were not for the direct French intervention in 1990.162 
In the 1990s, with the introduction of multiparty elections, the French supplied election 
observers to provide their stamp of legitimacy to the international audience.163 Since the 
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French were the last safeguard to defend the regime in Gabon against overthrow, the regime 
did not have to rely upon public goods.  
By the 2000s, France had divested from their control of Gabonese oil, which 
diminished their incentive to support the regime.164 With less French investment, the 2009 
and 2016 elections saw French criticism and a likely possibility that France would no 
longer directly intervene to save the regime in the future.165 Since the French employed 
coercive force to save the regime and provided international legitimacy to fraudulent 
elections, Bongo and the PDG did not have to rely to a large extent on public goods to stay 
in power.  
Coercion has always been a tool for the party and the Bongo dynasty. From the 
beginning of the regime to the most recent 2016 election, opponents of the Bongo dynasty 
have been harassed, arrested, and even found dead.166 Ahead of every multiparty election, 
the regime has used coercion, primarily from the Presidential Guard, to attack members of 
the press, opposition groups that will not support the party, and popular mobilization in the 
streets.167 Violence has been common during elections to suppress the opposition and 
garner a party victory. In the latest presidential election, where Ali Bongo nearly tied with 
Jean Ping, a former party elite, the Presidential Guard attacked the opposition headquarters, 
killing dozens.168 As long as the party can rely upon violence to coerce the opposition, 
public goods will not be the primary factor for winning elections and staying in power.  
The party and the Bongo dynasty have also used vote rigging to win elections, 
allowing them to avoid the pressure to provide more public goods. From Omar Bongo’s 
first multiparty election in 1993 to Ali Bongo’s latest 2016 presidential election, vote 
rigging has been apparent. When compared to the rest of the country, the home region of 
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Omar Bongo always has a higher voter turnout, has less restrictions to vote early, and 
possibly allow voters to vote more often.169 In Omar Bongo’s first election, he even 
cancelled the second round of elections and declared himself victor before the results, since 
he feared he would lose. He then employed coercive security services to guarantee his 
victory.170 Despite these instances of vote rigging, French support enabled Bongo to 
unfairly win the 1993 multiparty elections without much international scrutiny. This 
changed in 2009 and 2016, when the Presidential elections started to receive international 
complaints, and requests for recounts.171 Ali Bongo did not even win a majority in 2009, 
only a plurality.172 Despite the loss of French support, the regime will likely continue to 
prioritize vote rigging over public goods as a survival mechanism.  
4. Hypothesis 1 Summary 
Gabon only moderately relies upon public goods to stay in power, because the 
regime has other stronger means of survival. The party initially provided some goods as 
patronage to maintain a united elite network in the party. Once multiparty elections were 
introduced in 1990, Bongo and the party could not rely on the elite patronage network 
alone, and they formed a broader coalition in 2000 to successfully increase their electorate. 
This coalition was formed with public goods bargaining involving an array of local leaders. 
Before multiparty elections, the PDG was broad and inclusive, integrating with society, 
and united Gabon’s elites under one political organization. After multiparty elections in 
1990, the PDG became more responsive to its population, as it must compete in elections, 
and provide public goods. The PDG’s actions support my claim that single-party regimes 
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will distribute public goods at greater rates than personalist regimes because they are more 
inclusive, diverse, and responsive to their populace. 
As will be discussed at greater length in the next section, there also appears to be a 
connection between electoral threats to political survival and the distribution of public 
goods, and these more urgent political survival needs may be further magnified by the 
diminishing amount of oil revenue available to the PDG. Ali Bongo’s Gabon Emergent 
plan, introduced in 2009, is evidence of the party adapting to these changes by raising the 
importance of public goods distribution. As Gabon loses its old survival tactics, primarily 
the French support, the party will likely continue to raise the importance of public goods 
to try to maintain their rule.  
E. HYPOTHESIS 2: TIME HORIZON AND PUBLIC GOODS 
The PDG regime in Gabon faces two different threats to survival, each with 
different impacts on time horizons and public goods. In earlier periods the regime was more 
vulnerable to threats of extraconstitutional removals like coups or popular overthrow. Since 
then, however, their time horizons have shifted to align with the electoral cycle; this has 
brought about more institutionalized political threats, namely in the form of elections. 
While the first is unpredictable, the second is not—and the latter forces the regime to 
behave with more accountability to the population.  
1. Time Horizons and Extraconstitutional Removal 
The regime has effectively leveraged its five survival strategies to lower its risk 
from the threat of extraconstitutional removal which, prior to the introduction of multiparty 
elections in 1990, brought about the stability necessary for consistent public goods 
provision. However, these tactics have also undermined democratic accountability, leading 
to an overall small positive effect on public goods. The longer time horizon during this 
time had also lowered spending on coercive goods, like security services or the military.  
 
The Bongo family and the PDG had managed to minimize threats of 
extraconstitutional removal by employing the previously mentioned survival factors: 
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French involvement, coercion, vote rigging, patronage, and public goods. These strategies 
had enabled the Bongo family in particular to rule Gabon with minimal concern for 
instability, thereby lengthening their time horizons. This stability is evident, for example, 
in a recent 2019 coup attempt. While Ali Bongo was disabled and out of the country for 
months receiving medical treatment following a stroke, the coup attempt by five soldiers 
had no real chances of success.173 Ali Bongo’s direct control over the security services, 
and the party’s patronage system meant that the coup plotters were a minority within the 
military, and would not garner elite support.  
The regime’s long-time horizon against extraconstitutional removal led to a slight 
net positive to public goods, since funding for coercion was a lower priority than it was in 
other states, like Chad. If a regime was concerned with physical safety above all, they 
would prioritize funding coercive goods, like security services instead of health and 
education. Since the Gabonese regime has had stability from the afore mentioned factors, 
they could spend less on coercive goods, and more on public goods. Gabon’s military 
spending has ranged between one and two percent of GDP for most of the regime’s history, 
lower than other oil-exporting SSA states like Chad, Equatorial Guinea, or Angola.174 
Gabon’s stability against extraconstitutional removal and violence also limits interruptions 
of public goods distribution from instances like insurrection, political violence, and civil 
war. The regime’s long-time horizon against violent removal has provided a slight positive 
effect on public goods. While it does not directly provide more goods, the lack of 
disruptions, and the lower priority of coercive goods means that there are more resources 
available to focus on distributing public goods.  
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2. Elections and Time Horizons 
With the introduction of multiparty elections 1990, the political threats have 
become institutionalized via elections, leading the regime to behave in ways that are more 
conducive to public goods provision. Although elections have arguably shortened time 
horizons, the pressure of electoral contestation shapes the regime’s behavior to provide 
public goods to compete to gain a broader wining coalition. After Omar Bongo nearly lost 
the first multiparty presidential elections, the party adapted; namely, by negotiating with 
smaller opposition parties to form a broad winning coalition. The survival tactics of 
coercion and vote rigging are still used in the multiparty elections, but the regime also 
expands their patronage network and uses public goods to increase the coalition size. The 
coalition building and bargaining for goods gave Omar Bongo and the PDG a sizeable 
coalition, of 29 out of a total 35 parties to win the 1998 and 2005 presidential elections 
with significantly larger majorities of 79% in 2005.175  
Ali Bongo’s rule, starting in 2009, demonstrates the increasing link between the 
institutionalization of a shorter time horizon and more public goods. Ali Bongo could not 
rely on the same survival tactics of his father. He had less funds for the patronage network, 
faced former party elites as rivals, and did not have the support of France.176 These factors 
contributed to Ali Bongo’s shorter time horizon and he became more reliant upon public 
goods to win elections and stay in power. Soon after taking office in 2009, he announced 
a major public works project, the Gabon Emergent, to shape Gabon’s economy into a 
diverse emerging economy, with higher human capital and more public infrastructure.177 
Under Ali Bongo, public investment has increased significantly, and it is likely due at least 
partially to his political vulnerability that forms a short time horizon.  
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3. Hypothesis 2 Summary 
Gabon has used their five survival strategies to minimize extraconstitutional threats 
of removal such that, up until 1990 when elections were introduced, they had long time 
horizons. The regime’s long-time horizon allowed Gabon to avoid political violence, 
turmoil, and civil war, there were no disruptions to public goods distribution. The regime 
also did not have to prioritize funding the coercive goods, since France was their backstop 
against removal. Once multiparty elections were introduced, the regime became vulnerable 
to institutionalized competition. With this new short time horizon, the more vulnerable the 
regime became to electoral competition, the more likely they were to prioritize public 
goods spending. If Bongo and the PDG’s other survival strategies lose effectiveness, and 
electoral contestation’s pressure increase in the future, Gabon may continue to behave in 
ways that are beneficial for public goods distribution.  
F. HYPOTHESIS 3: OIL REVENUE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
Like Chad, oil revenue is a significant contributor to public goods provision in 
Gabon. The oil sector in Gabon dominates the economy by providing most of its GDP, its 
exports, and its government revenue; this ratio has been maintained since the 1970s, when 
oil exports began.178 Their large reservoir of oil revenue leads to the availability of more 
funds for the government that can be used for public investment. Since oil production began 
in 1931 in Gabon, it has always been part of the governing calculus, leading to longer time 
horizons and revenues being channeled toward investment instead of repression. Despite 
the regime’s moderate priority for public goods, oil revenue allows Gabon to provide 
higher per capita spending on public goods than other SSA states.  
In terms of education, Gabon’s oil wealth allows it to spend 1.5 times more on 
education per student than other SSA states.179 Gabon also provides more education 
funding despite a lower spending rate per GDP than in SSA due to its oil wealth. The strong 
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link between oil-led growth and public goods is evident, particularly between the years of 
2000 and 2008, where GDP, which is strongly linked to oil revenue, grew nearly 3 times. 
During this time education spending per capita increased 2.5 times.  
Similar increases during this time are evident in the health sector. As Figures 5 and 
6 shows, the connection between oil led GDP growth between 2000 and 2008, and similar 
growth in Gabon’s health expenditure per capita between 2000 and 2008.  
 
Figure 5. Gabon’s GDP (current US$) 2000–2008.180 
 





Figure 6. Gabon’s Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US$) 
2000–2009.181  
There also exists evidence that when Gabon faces lower oil prices, public goods 
decrease, further demonstrating the linkage between oil and public goods. Public spending 
on goods fluctuates with the global price of oil. Figures 7 and 8 demonstrates the volatility 
of Gabon’s GDP, and the corresponding spending on health after 2009. This instability is 
evident in the 1990s, when Gabon added copays and user fees for healthcare, making it 
less accessible to the poor. This action coincided with significantly lower oil revenues in 
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Figure 7. Gabon’s GDP (current US$) 1960–2019.183  
 





Figure 8. Gabon’s Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US$) 
2000–2017.184 
In Gabon, there is strong evidence that public good spending increases with oil 
revenue. The same linkage also demonstrates that when oil revenue is lower than 
anticipated, public goods decrease. For Gabon, public goods are dependent on oil revenue, 
and because of oil, Gabon can spend more per capita on some public goods than other  
SSA states.  
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Gabon’s authoritarian regime has been in power for 60 years and has provided a 
moderate level of public goods due to the primacy of other survival strategies. For most of 
Gabon’s history, the regime relied on French interference, coercion, patronage, and vote-
rigging to stay in power. These survival strategies meant that the regime enjoyed stability 
and long-time horizons, therefore decreasing their incentives to invest more heavily in 
public goods. When the regime faced increasingly short, but institutionalized, political time 
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horizons after the introduction of multiparty elections, they increased the priority of public 
goods as a survival strategy. Additionally, oil in Gabon allows the regime to have higher 
per capita spending on public goods than the SSA average. As the cost of the regime’s 
other survival strategies increases, and the pressure of institutionalized short political time 
horizons continues, one can assess that the regime will rely more on public goods to stay 





















A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis has sought to understand whether and why different kinds of 
authoritarian regimes provide different levels of public goods. It has examined this question 
with case studies of two longstanding authoritarian regimes in Africa: Chad and Gabon. 
Chad and Gabon are similar in many ways, they are both authoritarian oil-exporting sub-
Saharan African states with a French colonial background, but they have had very different 
levels of investment in public goods. As this research has revealed, this difference in public 
goods provision is driven by the different types of threats that the two regimes face. These 
threat differences lead to divergence in: 1) survival strategies associated with each type of 
regime; and 2) leaders’ time horizons. In both countries, oil revenues allow leaders to 
increase their investments in public goods, but they do not explain differences across the 
two regime types.  
For the first hypothesis, there is clear evidence that Chad and Gabon utilize 
different survival strategies based on of their regime types and the types of threats faced 
by each regime. Personalist regimes are vulnerable to collapse from non-institutionalized 
coercive threats since the regime ends with the leader. Thus, personalist dictators are more 
interested in employing coercion as a survival tactic in response to these threats. In contrast, 
party regimes are less vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal.  
These different levels of vulnerability lead to different survival strategies which, in 
turn, impact the degree to which they prioritize public goods funding. Chad’s personalist 
regime does not prioritize public goods for its survival because its personalist leaders have 
primarily used coercion to face down the violent threats to their survival. This is due to the 
nature of personalist regimes, which tend to enjoy less popular and elite support and which 
tend to be less stable.185 As a result, the Chadian personalist regimes prioritize investments 
in security services that can offer regime protection, rather than public goods that benefit 
the population.  
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Unlike the personalist regime in Chad, the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party 
(PDG) uses public goods as one of five survival strategies. The Gabonese single-party 
regime relies upon an inclusive and broad support base, such that it requires coalitions and 
unified elite support to survive. As such, the PDG cannot rely solely on coercion to survive, 
and therefore must employ a variety of survival strategies, one of which is public goods 
distribution. This results in the Gabonese single-party regime providing a moderate level 
of public goods.  
For the second hypothesis, the regimes in Chad and Gabon have featured different 
time horizons, in terms of both length and type, which affect the degree to which they 
prioritize funding either public goods or coercive goods. In Chad, leaders have had shorter 
time horizons because of threats of extraconstitutional removal from office, especially 
popular rebellions among some segments of the population. These threats lead to low 
spending on public goods since the regime’s focus is primarily on coercive protection to 
survive. Since the mid-1990s Déby has managed to reduce the vulnerability of his regime, 
leading to lower coercion spending and distribution of more public goods.  
Until 1990, Gabon faced few threats to their survival, leading to longer time 
horizons and little need to invest in public goods. Once multiparty elections were 
introduced, however, Gabon leaders’ time horizons became shaped primarily by elections. 
This shortening of time horizons, however, did not lead to a decrease in public goods. 
Instead, the more predictable threats of removal (elections) provides the regime with 
enough stability to reduce coercive goods spending and increase public goods investment. 
Even if elections in Gabon at times produce shortened time horizons, the regime provides 
public goods to grow its winning coalition to survive.  
For the third hypothesis, oil in both states contributes to funding public goods and 
stabilizes the regime, lowering the regime’s reliance on coercive goods, exerting a positive 
effect on public goods investment. There is clear evidence that oil largely provides the 
funding for both Chad’s and Gabon’s public goods: in addition, oil revenue supports the 
regimes’ other survival tactics, by providing tools to deescalate violence and fund a large 
patronage network of elites. However, Chad and Gabon have had different relationships 
with oil due to the amount of time the regimes have had to factor oil revenue into their 
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survival strategies. Because Gabon has had oil since its founding, the regime developed to 
utilize the oil resources for its survival. Whereas, in Chad, under the current personalist 
leader Déby, his regime’s survival tactics adapted with the influx of oil 13 years into his 
rule. In short, the oil revenue enables the regimes in both Chad and Gabon to prioritize 
coercive goods less and public goods more. These findings are summarized in Table 1. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS  
1. Academic 
This thesis adds to the literature on authoritarian regimes, in particular their 
relationship with public goods. The literature has largely focused on the difference between 
authoritarian and democratic regimes with respect to public goods. This thesis adds insight 
into the differences among different types of authoritarian regimes, the differences in time 
horizons, and the impacts of oil revenue. This work not only highlights variation within 
regime types but also adds to the study of African cases of authoritarian regimes, under 
which much of the African population live. It also adds the importance of focusing on 
differences in political survival strategies and time horizons between different types of 
regimes. Additionally, oil revenue is likely to increase public goods spending regardless of 
the other political dynamics. This work can lay a foundation for further investigations into 
the nuanced relationship between authoritarian regimes and public goods. The more we 
examine the reasons why regimes spend on public goods or coercive goods, the better we 
can understand the lives of the people under them.  
The study also contributes new knowledge about the political and institutional 
foundations of development. This thesis can add to literature on development and poverty 
reduction strategies. The findings demonstrate that for poverty reduction, party regimes 
and elections in particular are good for health, education, and infrastructure. In addition, 
oil was found to have benefited poverty reduction and development regardless of  
regime type.  
2. Policy 
The findings of my thesis could be applied by international governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their programs in 
authoritarian countries. States, IGOs, and NGOs can look at the regime type, party or 
personalist, and see which survival strategies the regime relies on, to better understand 
where their aid dollars may end up, either going to coercive goods, patronage, or actually 
supporting public goods. Additionally, they can examine the primary threats a regime, and 
specifically whether or not the regime faces intrastate violence that would shorten its time 
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horizon. In those cases, aid dollars may support coercive goods to prop up the regime 
instead of going to the people in the form of public goods.  
Lastly, the impact of oil on public goods is important for donors to understand since 
the government’s interest in public goods provision is very dependent on global oil prices. 
When global oil prices fall, aid groups can help sustain public goods provision, but once 
oil prices rise again, they could allow the regime, which has the resources, to fill the gap 
with new oil rents. These findings will assist these NGO / IGO’s research when they look 
at their public return on investment in terms of their aid donations toward public goods. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The thesis also points to several areas for future research on the relationship 
between authoritarian regimes, oil production, and public goods provision. An area for 
further investigation is the variation in length of time a country has produced oil and its 
volume of oil production and how these variables impact its investment into public goods. 
In the cases of Gabon and Chad, Gabon has had oil production for almost as long as the 
regime has existed, 60 years, and so has exported much more oil, while Chad has only 
exported oil since 2003. As this thesis has found, oil revenue provides both the funds for 
public goods and assists regime stability. Gabon has benefited from its older oil industry, 
in providing the stability for less coercive goods, and the funds to provide more public 
goods, that Chad did not have until recently. Since, in both countries, oil has been the 
primary source of funds for public goods, oil may be a larger factor than regime survival 
strategies in the specific public goods investment strategies in Chad and Gabon. Further 
research would need to look at the possible relationship between patterns of public goods 
spending and profit from oil exports, for which data were not readily available for this 
research, to determine if Chad and Gabon are spending comparable percentage of oil 
revenue on public goods, or if there is a inherent difference based off of their survival 
strategies and priorities. Such a study would have to take into account that the World Bank 
stipulated when it invested into Chad’s oil pipeline that it had to spend 70% of its oil 
revenue on public goods. This information would provide insight into policies that 
encourage oil-exporting countries to increase levels of public goods spending.  
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The research also found significant evidence of foreign interference in both Chad 
and Gabon, and further research should be undertaken to look at how the effects of external 
actors change the regime’s prioritization of public goods distribution. French support, in 
particular, has played a potentially important role in shaping leaders’ threats and time 
horizons in both countries. The personalist regimes in Chad have all been somewhat 
supported by the French, especially in terms of military protection. In addition, the Chadian 
regimes were more vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal from militias with external 
support. For example, the FRONILAT armies supported by Sudan, and Libya. It is clear 
from these examples that external support shapes both threats and time horizons of 
authoritarian leaders. If the Chadian regimes did not face externally supported armies, or 
if the French military had consistently supported the regimes and subsidized the cost of 
coercion, then the personalist regimes could have faced a longer time horizon and might 
have spent less on coercive goods and more on public goods. By contrast, the PDG and the 
Bongo family in the 20th century have largely avoided challenges from any externally 
supported groups and have benefited from consistent French support. Foreign interference 
from France has subsidized both authoritarian regimes at different levels and changed their 
calculus for survival strategy and their time horizons. Future research should examine the 
extent of the impact of foreign actors on authoritarian regimes and their public goods 
distribution. Theoretically, if foreign interference is a stronger factor on public goods 
provision than previously thought, it could alter the role of the international community in 
terms of peacekeeping or direct support to the regimes so that they can decrease their 
reliance upon coercive goods, and possibly provide more public goods.  
D. FUTURE FOR CHAD AND GABON 
Both Chad and Gabon are spending more on public goods now than previously in 
their histories. Over time in Gabon, the cost of using strategies of survival that are not 
based on public goods distribution has increased: the regime lost its French support in the 
2000s, oil prices and revenue have decreased since 1997, and increasing pressure from 
international observers has dampened their ability to rig elections. Coercion will continue 
to be a survival strategy, but without French support it will be more costly. As the other 
survival strategies increase in cost, public goods will likely grow. In addition, as multiparty 
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elections in Gabon become more and more competitive, the regime will likely continue to 
use public goods to form large enough coalitions to win at the polls.  
Chad, on the other hand, will likely see consistent investment into public goods 
unless new threats to the Déby regime appear. The regime, however, remains highly 
personalist, implying that his death or absence will almost certainly rupture this public 
investment and possibly send Chad into another cycle of short time horizons and a 
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